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I - GENERAL

- A. Purpose: To provide a plan (in support of RSB D 7/c) for the execution of covert measures incident to a cease-fire in Korea, and prior to political negotiations on Korean issues.
- B. Pariod Covered by Flan: This is a contingency plan. Full implementation will be in order only if an armistice or cease-fire is concluded. Fending the development of this contingency, appropriate preparations for post-cease-fire operations will be integrated into the pattern of routine covert operations.

C. Areas of Responsibility:

- Areas included within the FE Theater of military operations.
 a) Korea, b) Japan
- Areas contiguous to the FE Theater of military operations.
 a) Manchuria and Eastern Siberia, b) Formosa and South China.
- 3. Non-contiguous areas?
- D. <u>Policy</u>: This plan is based on RSB D 7/c, and has been approved by the RSC 10/2 Consultants.

E. Assumptions:

- 1. A cease-fire will be concluded in Korea.
- 2. CINCFE and the UN Forces under his command will adhere to the ceasefire terms, but will render logistical support to CIA operations as is covertly feasible.
- 3. The pre-arranged covert transfer of unconventional warfare assets from CINCFE to CIA will be made.
- *NOTE. Separate guidances will be sent by DCI to field stations outside

 FE area recommending actions in furtherance of the special psychologi
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- 4. The existing command relationship between CINCFE and CIA will be continued for an indefinite period fater a cease-fire has been concluded.
- F. Concept of CIA operations with respect to cease-fire or breakoff contingencies:

Prior to Breakoff or Cease-fire 1. Continue Routine Action Operations.

Cease-fire Breakoff

- 1. Continue Routine Action Operations plus operations based on increased capabilities from assets transferred from military control.
- 1. Continue Routine Action Operations.

- 2. Conduct Propaganda Campaign in preparation for either cease-fire or breakoff contingencies.
- 2. Gear Propaganda to conform with Contingency to conform with guidance.
 - 2. Geer Propaganda Contingency guidance.

II MISSIONS

- A. Conduct covert operations in North Korea, Communist China, and Communist-dominated areas contiguous to the military theater of operations to weaken the position and morale of the enemy.
- B. Conduct planned and integrated programs of covert psychological action and propaganda to:
 - 1. Create favorable world-wide public opinion and support for the UN/US policies and actions in Korea, particularly as they apply to the military and political aspects of the Armistice negotiations.
 - 2. Create world-wide public opinion adverse to the Soviet

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III - PROGRAMS AND MAJOR ANDKS

A. THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (see Assumptions 3 & 4, above)

PROGRAM 1. Korea (Supports Mission "A" above)

PROGRAM II. Kores (Supports Mission "B" above)

FROGRAM III. Korea (Supports Mission "C" above)

B. CONTIGUOUS AREAS

PROGRAM Chinese Mainland (Supports Mission "A" above)

Frustrate and punish by all possible covert means the Chinese Communist regime to weaken its will and ability to communist its

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